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International cooperation on economic migration has been 
difficult to achieve. The interests of emigration countries 
(“source countries”) and immigration countries (“destination 
countries”) seem impossible to align. These countries disagree on 
who should migrate: source countries resist migration that leads 
to a brain drain, while destination countries welcome these very 
migrants given that they are likely to be the most productive cit-
izens and the least likely to become fiscal burdens on the desti-
nation country. In addition, destination countries resist migra-
tion that leads to domestic unemployment through labor 
replacement. As a result, international economic migration re-
mains restricted at a substantial cost to world welfare. 
This Article argues that the global welfare gains from mi-
gration can be divided in a way that makes all stakeholders bet-
ter off. It develops the idea of a “Migration Fund” that is used to 
insure the destination country against fiscally induced or other-
wise undesirable migration while simultaneously serving as a 
mechanism to compensate the source country for the potential 
adverse effects of outward migration. As a condition for entry, 
the migrant or his sponsor deposits funds in a Migration Fund. 
If the migrant subsequently becomes unemployed or otherwise 
unable to support himself, this Fund will reimburse the destina-
tion country for the welfare benefits the migrant draws. Alterna-
tively, the Fund would cover the costs of the migrant’s possible 
voluntary repatriation or, when warranted, deportation. This 
way, the Fund removes the concern that the migrant imposes a 
cost on the destination country. However, if the migrant remains 
employed and hence continues to contribute to the welfare of the 
 
 † Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Jagdish Bhagwati, El-
eanor Brown, Adam Cox, Eric Posner, Alan Sykes and the participants of The University 
of Chicago Immigration Law and Institutional Design Symposium, held at The Universi-
ty of Chicago Law School on June 15 and 16, 2012, for their helpful comments. Taimoor 
Aziz, Fannie Chen, and Erim Tuc provided excellent research assistance. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2770636 
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destination country through his labor and tax payments, the 
funds would be released and divided between the migrant (or his 
sponsor) and the source country. This way, the migrant or his 
sponsor would be entitled to recover part of the funds they ini-
tially deposited. The source country would similarly be compen-
sated for the loss of its productive citizen, including the costs the 
source country might have incurred in educating and training 
the migrant. Finally, a productive migrant who voluntarily re-
turns to the source country after some period of time—without 
thus imposing a cost on either the destination or the source 
country—could reclaim the entire funds deposited into the Mi-
gration Fund. 
This Article is premised on an idea that existing restrictions 
on migration are inefficient. Quotas employed by many countries 
impede the entry of many desirable migrants. At the same time, 
abandoning migration controls altogether is too risky as long as 
there are substantial differences across the welfare systems of 
various source and destination countries, potentially incentiviz-
ing migrants to relocate to countries with more generous social 
welfare systems.1 It proposes a system that enables greater free-
dom for people to move across borders while insuring destina-
tion countries against the risks of opening the doors for undesir-
able migrants. At the same time, it takes seriously the concerns 
that source countries may incur costs when losing their human 
capital to countries that can offer more attractive opportunities 
for migrants. In the end, the goal is to devise a mechanism that 
enhances global welfare while also distributing that welfare across 
the key stakeholders in a way that makes no party worse off. 
Before proceeding, a few clarifications will likely help the 
reader. First, this Article focuses on economic migration (that is, 
labor migration) even though some insights apply to the broader 
immigration debate as well. The emphasis is on permanent mi-
gration (admission of migrants for permanent residence) as op-
posed to temporary migration (including guest worker pro-
grams). Second, the analysis is limited to the economic and fiscal 
effects of migration, intentionally omitting the discussion of var-
ious noneconomic costs and benefits involved. Finally, this Ar-
ticle takes the concerns expressed by source and destination 
countries—including fears of brain drain or fiscally induced mi-
gration—seriously without taking a stance on their empirical va-
 
 1 See Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical 
Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in Warren F. Schwartz, ed, Justice in Immigra-
tion 158, 193 (Cambridge 1995). 
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lidity or relative importance. Rather, it treats these concerns as 
sources of political constraints that currently prevent countries 
from liberalizing migration flows and advances a proposal that 
is motivated by a desire to overcome these constraints. 
I.  THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
MIGRATION 
Economists agree that liberalization of migration flows 
would enhance global welfare. The economic argument for free 
migration rests on the same foundation as the argument for free 
trade of goods.2 Allowing people to move freely across the bor-
ders would allow for the maximization of world welfare through 
an optimal allocation of the labor force across markets. Accord-
ing to some estimates, elimination of immigration controls 
would more than double the world’s real income.3 Even the more 
conservative estimates point to significant welfare gains, rang-
ing from 5 percent to 12 percent of the world’s real income, or 
from $2 trillion to $4.3 trillion per year.4 Despite the prospect of 
such significant welfare gains, migration remains the least lib-
eralized factor of production, subject to high barriers in most 
countries.5 The inefficient status quo reflects political opposition 
to migration, in particular the perception that any gains from 
migration flows would be unequally distributed, leaving signifi-
cant groups within societies worse off. 
This Part outlines the costs and benefits that the liberaliza-
tion of international economic migration would have on the key 
stakeholders affected by such liberalization: the migrant, the 
destination country, and the source country, respectively. It fo-
cuses on the costs more than the benefits of liberalization in 
recognition that it is the perceived costs that form the source of 
the political resistance to liberalizing migration controls. 
 
 2 See, for example, id at 162–68. 
 3 See, for example, Bob Hamilton and John Whalley, Efficiency and Distributional 
Implications of Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility: Calculations and Policy Implica-
tions, 14 J Dev Econ 61, 70–74 (1984). 
 4 See Jonathon W. Moses and Bjørn Letnes, The Economic Costs to International 
Labor Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion, 32 World Dev 1609, 1616 (2004). 
 5 This is notwithstanding the estimates that migration restrictions impose a 
greater burden on the world economy than existing trade restrictions do. See The Long-
est Journey, Economist 3 (Nov 2, 2002); Howard F. Chang, Migration as International 
Trade: The Economic Gains from the Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J Intl L & 
Foreign Aff 371, 373 (1998). 
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A. The Costs and Benefits to the Migrant 
A common reason to migrate relates to better economic op-
portunities available in the destination country.6 As long as the 
endowments of capital and labor are uneven across countries, 
individuals can gain by relocating to a country that offers the 
highest return on their labor.7 Migration takes place when the 
migrant believes that his expected lifelong wage earnings in the 
destination country exceed his expected earnings in the source 
country, even when various transaction costs associated with 
migration are subtracted from the perceived gains of migration.8 
According to the estimates by the World Bank, a migrant nearly 
triples his income on average in the destination country, even 
after remittances sent to the home country are subtracted from 
his income.9 The costs associated with migration on the migrant 
himself are likely to be noneconomic, making the economic case 
for free migration unambiguously a positive one for an individu-
al migrant looking to take advantage of these opportunities. 
B. The Costs and Benefits to the Destination Country 
The country that receives migrants experiences significant 
gains. Several studies suggest that immigration has a net bene-
fit to most citizens in the destination countries.10 Despite the 
 
 6 See Michael J. Trebilcock and Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy of Emigra-
tion and Immigration, 81 NYU L Rev 234, 241–47 (2006). 
 7 See id at 241–42. For examples of economic models, see W. Arthur Lewis, Eco-
nomic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, 22 Manchester School Econ & 
Soc Stud 139, 176–77, 190 (1954); Gustav Ranis and John C.H. Fei, A Theory of Econom-
ic Development, 51 Am Econ Rev 533, 533–34 (1961); Michael P. Todaro, Internal Migra-
tion in Developing Countries: A Review of Theory, Evidence, Methodology, and Research 
Priorities 21–28 (International Labour Office 1976). 
 8 See D.S. Massey, Theory of Migration, in Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, 
eds, 14 International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences 9828, 9829 
(Elsevier 2001). 
 9 See Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Mi-
gration 34 (World Bank 2006), online at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/ 
WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/11/14/000112742_20051114174928/additional/841401968 
_200510327112047.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013). 
 10 See, for example, James P. Smith and Barry Edmonston, eds, The New Ameri-
cans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration 334, 336 (National 
Academy 1997) (finding that immigration results in a net benefit of $1 to $10 billion to 
the US economy annually). Professors George Borjas, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence 
Katz note that a possible exception consists of some groups of native low-skill workers, in 
particular high school dropouts. George J. Borjas, Richard B. Freeman, and Lawrence F. 
Katz, How Much Do Immigration and Trade Affect Labor Market Outcomes?, 1997 
Brookings Papers on Econ Activity 1, 62–63 (showing that immigration explains 4 to 7 
percent of the decline of wages of high school graduates relative to college graduates 
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prospect of significant welfare gains, two principal concerns mil-
itate against opening borders for a large number of migrants. 
First, some migrants may impose a fiscal burden on the destina-
tion country, in particular if migrants are allowed access to pub-
lic entitlement programs immediately upon, or shortly after, 
immigrating.11 Second, the increase in migration flows may lead 
to labor replacement and hence unemployment among the citi-
zens of the destination country.12 Even in the absence of sound 
empirical support for these claims, fears associated with these 
two scenarios have dominated the public discourse, eroding any 
support for more open borders.13 
Probably the most common political objection to open bor-
ders is the fear that migrants may impose a fiscal burden on the 
welfare state. This is the case when the transfer payments the 
migrants receive from the destination country exceed their con-
tributions to the tax revenues of the destination country.14 As 
long as countries differ in their ability to offer various welfare 
benefits, the migrant may have an incentive to move to a coun-
try that provides subsidized healthcare, pension, education, and 
various other noncontributory welfare benefits. These cross-
national differences in entitlements reflect varying levels of eco-
nomic development as well as divergent political views on the 
appropriate scope of the welfare state, making any future har-
monization of these policies unlikely. Thus, fears of fiscally in-
duced migration are likely to persist going forward, notwith-
standing empirical studies suggesting that migrants, on 
average, are more likely to generate a net fiscal benefit to the 
destination country.15 
The public anxiety toward migrants also stems from the fear 
that these migrants displace domestic workers or depress their 
                                                                                                             
from 1980 to 1995). Even then, these costs are outweighed by the overall benefits to the 
destination country. Id at 66. 
 11 See Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law at 170–71 (cited in note 
1); Trebilcock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 271–76 (cited in note 6). 
 12 See Trebilcock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 269–71 (cited in note 6). See also 
Julie Murray, Jeanne Batalova, and Michael Fix, The Impact of Immigration on Native 
Workers: A Fresh Look at the Evidence 7–8 (Migration Policy Institute July 2006), online 
at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TF18_Murray.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013). 
 13 Naturally, the two concerns of the destination state—the migrant becoming a 
fiscal burden and the migrant displacing domestic workers—should not materialize at 
the same time. If the migrant is unemployed, he can be a burden on the welfare state but 
not displace domestic workers. If, on the other hand, the migrant is working, he may 
displace a domestic worker but should not burden the welfare state.  
 14 See Chang, 3 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Aff at 382–83 (cited in note 5). 
 15 See, for example, Smith and Edmonston, The New Americans at 334, 336 (cited 
in note 10) (examining the fiscal effects of migration on the United States). 
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wages.16 These concerns mirror the fears of import-competing 
industries that oppose free trade: the increase in the availability 
of foreign goods causes the consumption of some domestic goods 
to be replaced by the consumption of foreign goods, leading to 
unemployment by natives producing these same goods. Yet the 
losses to import-competing industries are often offset (or out-
weighed) by gains to exporting industries and domestic consum-
ers who advocate trade liberalization as a result. Similarly, the 
losses from open migration to displaced domestic workers should 
be offset by the presumed gains to domestic employers, who 
would benefit from the increase in the supply of workers, and to 
domestic consumers, who would gain access to the goods and 
services produced with those workers. Yet, the political forces 
resisting migration often prevail over the interests of employers 
and consumers predicted to gain from migration. 
C. The Costs and Benefits to the Source Country 
The source countries are often thought to be the biggest los-
ers under a free migration regime.17 The primary concern of the 
source countries relates to the loss of human capital. The out-
flow of talented individuals can lead to a “brain drain,” depriv-
ing these countries of their most productive individuals.18 These 
individuals are thought to contribute disproportionately to eco-
nomic growth and higher levels of development in the source 
country. The source countries also worry about the declining tax 
base, in particular if the migrants consist primarily of skilled 
individuals with the highest earning potential and hence also 
the highest capacity to pay taxes.19 
The extent of brain drain is subject to a contested theoreti-
cal debate and mixed empirical findings.20 The overall economic 
 
 16 See Murray, Batalova, and Fix, The Impact of Immigration on Native Workers at 
1 (cited in note 12) (stating that a 2006 poll suggests that 28 percent of Americans think 
that immigration has a negative effect on job availability in their communities). 
 17 See Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law at 168 (cited in note 1). 
 18 See Trebilcock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 247–51 (cited in note 6). See also John 
Douglas Wilson, Taxing the Brain Drain: A Reassessment of the Bhagwati Proposal, in Eli-
as Dinopoulos, et al, eds, Trade, Globalization and Poverty 254, 256–60 (Routledge 2008). 
 19 Obviously, this concern is relevant only if the expected decline in tax revenue 
exceeds the expected savings caused by the reduction in the migrants’ claims for enti-
tlement programs. 
 20 See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati and Koichi Hamada, The Brain Drain, In-
ternational Integration of Markets for Professionals and Unemployment: A Theoretical 
Analysis, 1 J Dev Econ 19, 34 (1974); Drain or Gain?, Economist 80 (May 28, 2011) (dis-
cussing several studies that found that emigration creates benefits for the source country 
by way of remittances and increased incentives to invest in education, among other 
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effect of migration on source countries is difficult to disentangle 
given the potential economic benefits of migration outflows.21 
Migrants may repatriate some of their earnings though remit-
tances.22 Indeed, remittances constitute a more important source 
of capital to many countries than any form of foreign aid.23 The 
prospect of economic migration also creates positive incentive ef-
fects, such as higher levels of investment in education.24 Migra-
tion can also lead to “brain circulation” as opposed to brain 
drain: Some migrants return to their homeland, contributing to 
the economy of the source country with an enhanced skill set, 
knowledge, and established networks in the destination coun-
try.25 And even if these migrants stay in the destination country, 
they can spur investment and business opportunities by facili-
tating trade and economic connections between the source and 
the destination countries.26 Still, the developing-country concern 
over brain drain has dominated the migration debates, making 
many of these countries skeptical of any policies that would in-
crease the outflow of their productive citizens to countries with 
better economic opportunities. 
                                                                                                             
things); William J. Carrington and Enrica Detragiache, How Big is the Brain Drain? *24 
(International Monetary Fund Working Paper, July 1998), online at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/wp/wp98102.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (finding that migration rates are 
higher for higher skill levels and that a number of countries in the Caribbean, Central 
America, and Africa face losses of more than 30 percent of their high-skilled citizens); 
Oded Stark, Christian Helmenstein, and Alexia Prskawetz, A Brain Gain with a Brain 
Drain, 55 Econ Letters 227, 233 (1997). 
 21 See Bhagwati and Hamada, 1 J Dev Econ at 1920 (cited in note 20). 
 22 See Global Economic Prospects at 85 (cited in note 9) (describing the importance 
of remittances, and estimating that in 2005 remittances totaled an estimated $167 billion). 
 23 See Dean Yang, Migrant Remittances, 25 J Econ Persp 129, 129–30 (Spring 
2011); Dilip Ratha and Sanket Mohapatra, Increasing the Macroeconomic Impact of Re-
mittances on Development 1 (World Bank Nov 26, 2007), online at http://www.law.yale.edu/ 
documents/pdf/Clinics/9_Increasing_the_Macro_Impact_of_Remittances_on_Development.pdf 
(visited Mar 3, 2013). 
 24 A study of Cape Verdeans found that a 10 percent increase in the country’s 
young people’s probability of migrating raises their probability of completing secondary 
school by 8 percent. See Drain or Gain?, Economist at 80 (cited in note 20). These incen-
tives to acquire education are facilitated by the “point systems” that some countries use 
to screen desirable migrants. Migrants that aspire to enter these countries are motivated 
to acquire education that allows them to meet the educational prerequisites. See Trebil-
cock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 251–52 (cited in note 6). A study on young Fiji citizens 
of Indian origin supports this assumption. See Drain or Gain?, Economist at 80 (cited in 
note 20). 
 25 See Trebilcock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 253–55 (cited in note 6). 
 26 See id at 259–60. 
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II.  EXISTING POLICIES TO RESTRICT MIGRATION FLOWS 
The above discussion suggests a deep divide between migra-
tion policies favored by destination countries and source coun-
tries, respectively. Destination countries favor policies intended 
to encourage desirable migration—migrants that add to the hu-
man capital and tax base without displacing domestic workers—
while seeking to restrict undesirable migration—migrants that 
burden the fiscal state of the country or displace domestic work-
ers. Source countries favor policies intended to discourage the 
emigration of the citizens that contribute most to the develop-
ment potential of the country. With respect to migrants that 
leave, source countries seek to encourage these individuals to 
remit part of their destination country income or, ultimately, to 
return to the source country. This Part discusses the specific pol-
icies that destination and source countries adopt to achieve 
these outcomes. 
A.  Migration Policies Adopted by Destination Countries 
Destination countries pursue a number of policies to control 
the entry of migrants. These policies include ex ante restrictions 
such as quotas that regulate the overall volume of migration. In 
addition, destination countries use various qualitative entry 
screens in an effort to encourage desirable migration and deter 
undesirable migration. After a migrant is allowed entry, desti-
nation countries employ a host of ex post policies to ensure that 
migrants remain productive and law-abiding residents of the 
destination country. 
Quotas are commonly used to regulate the number of mi-
grants the destination country accepts each year. The reliance 
on quotas allows the destination country to control the vari-
ous negative externalities of migration, including “congestion 
effects,”27 labor market effects, as well as fiscal and political 
effects that an uncontrolled flow of migrants could pose on the 
economic and political stability in the destination country. The 
 
 27 Congestion effects refer to the increased use of public spaces and infrastructure 
such as roads, parks, and beaches in the destination country. See Trebilcock and Sudak, 
81 NYU L Rev at 281–83 (cited in note 6); Chi-Chur Chao, Bharat R. Hazari, and Jean-
Pierre Laffargue, Public Good Congestion and the Optimal Number of Immigrants *8 
(Centre pour la Recherche Economique et ses Applications Sept 2006), online at http:// 
www.cepremap.ens.fr/depot/docweb/docweb0607.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013). 
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United States, for instance, relies on quotas to regulate the total 
number of migrants it accepts each year.28 
In addition, destination countries typically identify certain 
categories of migrants that are not eligible for an admission 
even within the set quotas. They carry out basic national securi-
ty, criminality, and health background checks before admitting 
a migrant into the country.29 The costs imposed by a migrant 
posing a national security threat or prone to criminal activity 
are well-accepted grounds for denying entry. Health checks are 
motivated by a presumption that a migrant suffering from seri-
ous illnesses will not likely be a productive resident and will in-
stead make a disproportionate use of welfare payments offered 
by the destination country.30 
Beyond disqualifying unambiguously undesirable migrants, 
countries often seek to screen the remaining categories of mi-
grants with the help of various proxies that allow them to pre-
dict which migrants are likely to become productive residents 
that successfully assimilate into the culture of the destination 
country. Countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 
use point systems that help them select migrants with desirable 
demographic and educational qualities.31 These entry screens 
are designed to encourage high-skill migration that is believed 
to contribute most to the welfare of the destination country. The 
United States follows a different strategy. It primarily seeks to 
ensure that admitted migrants possess labor market skills that 
are complementary (as opposed to overlapping) with the labor 
market skills of its native workers. This screening method miti-
gates the labor displacement effects of migration and entails 
employers certifying that the employment of foreign labor does 
not have an adverse effect on domestic labor.32 The United 
States also requires that every migrant—including those spon-
sored by a relative as opposed to an employer—show that he or 
his sponsor has sufficient resources to ensure that the migrant 
 
 28 See, for example, Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 203(a), 8 USC 
§ 1153(a)(1) (capping the number of visas to be allocated to unmarried sons and daugh-
ters of citizens at 23,400). See also Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law at 
183–93 (cited in note 1). 
 29 See Trebilcock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 276–77 (cited in note 6). 
 30 See id at 276. 
 31 See id at 278–79. 
 32 See id at 278. In practice, the US employer must show that no qualified domestic 
workers are available or willing to perform the same job that the employer offers to the 
migrant. 
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will not “become a public charge.”33 Some countries take a step 
further in “selling” the right of entry.34 Belize used to allow mi-
grants to buy citizenship at the price of $50,000.35 More common-
ly, countries grant admission for migrants making a sizeable in-
vestment in their domestic economies.36 All these policies, while 
notably different in their formulation, share the goal of seeking 
to select productive migrants while screening out migrants that 
are expected to impose a net cost on the destination country. 
If a migrant clears the ex ante screens and is allowed entry, 
the destination countries still employ certain policies to ensure 
that the adverse effects of migration will not materialize ex post. 
Destination countries may limit the migrant’s access to many 
welfare benefits immediately upon entry. Further, some destina-
tion countries seek to facilitate voluntary repatriation by mi-
grants that have limited financial means. Denmark, for instance, 
offers repatriation benefits to (non-EU) migrants who are pre-
pared to voluntarily return home but have no financial means to 
do so.37 Repatriation benefits cover not only the migrant’s travel 
expenses, but also the cost of healthcare and prescription medi-
cations for one year after the return as well as pension benefits 
for the period of five years back in the source country (a so-called 
“reintegration allowance”). The ultimate policy tool used by the 
destination country in the case of unsuccessful migration is de-
portation. The grounds for deportation differ from one destina-
tion country to another, but those grounds often involve mi-
 
 33 Chang, 3 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Aff at 393 & n 49 (cited in note 5), quoting 
INA § 212(a)(1)(4)(A), 8 USC § 1182(a)(1)(4)(A). 
 34 For an argument that the United States should participate in this endeavor, see 
Julian L. Simon, The Price of Citizenship: Auctioning Immigration Visas Helps Foreign-
ers and Americans Alike, 39 Pol Rev 71, 7172 (1987). 
 35 See Elizabeth C. Babcock and Dennis Conway, Why International Migration Has 
Important Consequences for the Development of Belize, 26 Yearbook: Conference of Latin 
Americanist Geographers 71, 75 (2000). 
 36 See Uma A. Segal, United States: The Changing Face of the United States of 
America, in Uma A. Segal, Doreen Elliott, and Nazneen S. Mayadas, eds, Immigration 
Worldwide: Policies, Practices, and Trends 29, 31 (Oxford 2010) (describing America’s 
“investor program” which “issues approximately 10,000 visas annually to those who are 
willing to invest between $500,000 and one million dollars” in the United States). See 
also James Walsh, Navigating Globalization: Immigration Policy in Canada and Aus-
tralia, 1945–2007, 23 Soc Forum 786, 800 (2008) (discussing Canada’s point system for 
entrepreneurs, including the requirement for an investment of more than Can$500,000 
for five years in a Canadian business that preserves Canadian jobs). 
 37 See Repatriation Benefits *1 (Dansk Flygtninge Hjælp), online at http://flygtning.dk/ 
fileadmin/uploads/pdf/Saadan_hjaelper_vi_PDF/repatriering_PDF/Muligheder_for_oekonomisk 
_stoette_-_ENGELSK_2013.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013). See also Liav Orgad and Theodore 
Ruthizer, Race, Religion and Nationality in Immigration Selection: 120 Years after the 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 Const Commen 237, 293 (2010). 
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grants being convicted of some criminal activity or violating 
immigration laws.38 
B. Migration Policies Adopted by Source Countries 
Source countries pursue policies that mitigate the costs of 
emigration. These policies can be aimed at discouraging human 
capital outflows, encouraging return migration, or maximizing 
the source country’s share of the migrant’s destination country 
income. 
Few countries actually prevent their citizens from emigrat-
ing, for instance, by requiring exit visas as a condition for leav-
ing.39 Some economists have proposed the use of “exit taxes” as 
ways for source countries to retain a portion of the migrant’s in-
come.40 Yet these coercive proposals have been controversial, and 
few countries have resorted to them in practice. South Korea 
presents a rare example of a country that has successfully taxed 
some of its emigrant citizens, specifically when these migrants 
work abroad under Korean government contracts.41 Professor 
Kim Barry discusses an example where the Korean government 
helped Korean construction companies using Korean migrant 
workers secure contracts in the Middle East. Here, Korea not 
only withheld these migrants’ income taxes, but also required a 
large portion of the migrants’ salaries to be deposited in foreign 
currency accounts held in Korean banks.42 In contrast to such 
mandatory taxes, Eritrea has imposed a “voluntary tax” of 2 
 
 38 See, for example, INA § 237, 8 USC § 1227. 
 39 Exit visas were used, for instance, by the former Soviet Union. See Albert Kaga-
novitch, Stalin’s Great Power Politics, the Return of Jewish Refugees to Poland, and Con-
tinued Migration to Palestine, 1944–1946, 26 Holocaust and Genocide Stud 59, 66–70 
(2012) (discussing the application of Soviet exit visas to Polish Jews). Today, communist 
Cuba and Nepal still require their citizens to obtain a permit to leave the country. See 
Eric Retter, Comment, You Can Check Out Any Time You Like, but We Might Not Let 
You Leave: Cuba’s Travel Policy in the Wake of Signing the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 23 Emory Intl L Rev 651, 661–65 (2009) (discussing the Cu-
ban laws restricting citizen emigration amidst human rights reforms under Raul Cas-
tro’s government). Some countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, apply exit visas to 
foreign workers. See “As If I Am Not Human”: Abuses against Asian Domestic Workers in 
Saudi Arabia 26–33 (Human Rights Watch July 2008), online at http://www.hrw.org/ 
sites/default/files/reports/saudiarabia0708_1.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013) (describing the 
Saudi Arabian “Kafala” work authorization system for foreign workers); Heather E. 
Murray, Note, Hope for Reform Springs Eternal: How the Sponsorship System, Domestic 
Laws and Traditional Customs Fail to Protect Migrant Domestic Workers in GCC Coun-
tries, 45 Cornell Intl L J 462, 471 (2012). 
 40 See notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 41 See Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigra-
tion Context, 81 NYU L Rev 11, 37 (2006). 
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percent on its migrants’ annual income.43 The tax applies to all 
nonresident Eritreans.44 It is justified as a “moral obligation” 
that migrants have to help with the post-war nation-building ef-
forts.45 The tax has been sustained in exchange for giving the 
migrant community extensive political rights and thereby a 
larger stake in the country’s future.46 The vast majority of the 
migrants are thought to pay the tax given the social pressure to 
do so and the fact that the payments are made publicly.47 
Perhaps most commonly, source countries adopt policies 
that actively encourage migrants to send remittances to the 
source country. The prospect of remittances may even lead the 
source country to actively support, even subsidize, outmigration 
in some circumstances.48 Remittances have significant positive 
overall welfare effects on many source countries.49 In 2010, mi-
grants from developing countries sent home $325 billion in re-
mittances.50 Yet whether the remittances are sufficient to offset 
the negative effects of migration on source countries is subject to 
debate.51 Remittances can also have mixed effects on wealth dis-
tribution within source countries.52 Still, the overall positive 
macroeconomic effects of remittances have led source countries 
to pursue various strategies to increase them. They seek to cul-
tivate deeper emotional connections between the migrant and 
the source country in an effort to foster the migrant’s loyalty and 
thereby willingness to devote part of his income to remittances.53 
Source countries also seek to make the transmission of remit-
 
 43 Id at 38–39. 
 44 Id at 38. 
 45 Barry, 81 NYU L Rev at 38 (cited in note 41). 
 46 See Nadje Al-Ali, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser, The Limits to “Transnation-
alism”: Bosnian and Eritrean Refugees in Europe as Emerging Transnational Communi-
ties, 24 Ethnic & Racial Stud 578, 587–92 (2001). 
 47 See id at 593. 
 48 See David M. Forman, Protecting Philippine Overseas Contract Workers, 16 
Comp Labor L J 26, 44 (1994) (describing how the Philippines’s development strategy 
includes formal policies that recognize obligations to overseas workers in exchange for 
requirements to remit a portion of earnings to the Philippine government). See also Bar-
ry, 35 NYU L Rev at 51 (cited in note 41) (noting that source countries describe emi-
grants as heroic in order to promote remittances). 
 49 The top nineteen remittance world recipients receive more than 10 percent of 
their GDP in remittances. See Global Economic Prospects at 90 (cited in note 9). 
 50 See Drain or Gain?, Economist at 80 (cited in note 20) (citing World Bank estimates). 
 51 Compare Mihir A. Desai, Devesh Kapur, and John McHale, Sharing the Spoils: 
Taxing International Human Capital Flows, 11 Intl Tax & Pub Fin 663, 676 (2004), with 
Drain or Gain?, Economist at 80 (cited in note 20). 
 52 See Ali Mansoor and Bryce Quillin, eds, Migration and Remittances: Eastern Eu-
rope and the Former Soviet Union 67–73 (World Bank 2007). 
 53 See Barry, 81 NYU L Rev at 35–36 (cited in note 41).  
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tances easier by reducing the fees associated with the transfer 
process.54 Some countries have adopted policies to match remit-
tances to further encourage them. Mexico, for instance, matches 
migrants’ contributions made via “hometown associations” to 
improve the infrastructure of migrant-sending areas of Mexico.55 
The government’s “3×1 Program for Migrants” provides $3 for 
each $1 contributed this way for local development projects.56 
Similar positive effects can be accomplished if the source 
country creates incentives for the migrant to channel investment 
and capital flows back to the source country with the help of the 
networks the migrant builds in the destination country.57 Mexi-
co’s “Migrant Business Fund,” for instance, provides subsidized 
loans to Mexicans living in the United States willing to invest in 
Mexico.58 Similarly, India offers some of its emigrants preferen-
tial treatment under its investment and banking laws, consist-
ing of more generous investment terms than those available to 
foreign investors or resident Indians.59 Countries also actively 
encourage return migration with the help of incentive packages. 
Russia, for example, has since 2006 actively facilitated its emi-
grants’ return migration by offering returning migrants vari-
ous welfare and education benefits, in addition to paying for 
the return migrants’ costs of traveling and resettling in their 
former homeland.60 
C. Criticism of Existing Restrictions 
Even if some of the concerns motivating existing migration 
restrictions were valid, the set of policies that countries have 
implemented to respond to those concerns are largely inefficient. 
Quotas used by destination countries deter desirable migration, 
including the entry of migrants who would not burden the wel-
fare state or lead to displacement of domestic workers.61 Quotas 
 
 54 See id at 36. 
 55 Francisco Javier Aparicio and Covadonga Meseguer, Collective Remittances and 
the State: The 3×1 Program in Mexican Municipalities, 40 World Dev 206, 206 (2012).  
 56 Id. 
 57 See Trebilcock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 259–60 (cited in note 6).  
 58 See 3×1 Citizens’ Initiative (International Labour Organization Aug 7, 2009), online 
at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=44 
(visited Mar 3, 2013). 
 59 See Barry, 81 NYU L Rev at 41 (cited in note 41). 
 60 See Vladimir Iontsev, Irina Ivakhnyuk, and Svetlana Soboleva, Russia: Immi-
gration to Russia, in Segal, Elliott, and Mayadas, eds, Immigration Worldwide 47, 60 
(cited in note 36). 
 61 See Trebilcock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 281 (cited in note 6). See also Pas-
chal O. Nwokocha, American Employment-Based Immigration Program in a Competitive 
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are also undesirable due to their inflexibility: they are set in ad-
vance and cannot adapt to the constantly changing needs of the 
labor market.62 Point systems allow destination countries to at-
tract primarily skilled migrants, but the empirical evidence sug-
gests this to be an imperfect proxy for these migrants’ productiv-
ity in the labor market.63 Attempts to restrict migrants’ access to 
welfare payments can similarly be complicated under constitu-
tional law constraints that prevent discrimination of residents 
in their access to basic support systems.64 Finally, labor market 
certifications are cumbersome and blatantly protectionist, con-
siderably limiting the employers’ opportunities to hire produc-
tive foreign migrants.65 
Any coercive policies employed by source countries to re-
strict emigration, including exit taxes, are questionable. While 
potentially effective in curtailing migration outflows, exit taxes 
simultaneously reduce the beneficial effects of migration to the 
migrant and the destination country. Also the source country 
might lose as it forgoes remittances that the exiting migrant 
would potentially send home. A productive migrant who sends 
remittances home benefits the source country more than a mi-
grant who is prevented from leaving and therefore underutilizes 
his potential in the source country. Exit taxes may also lead to 
resentment, causing the migrant to leave, even renounce his cit-
izenship, or otherwise sever his ties with the source country.66 
This type of resentment would also likely discourage the mi-
grant from sending remittances or considering eventual return. 
In contrast to coercive policies designed to deter outmigration, 
positive efforts to attract remittances and return migration seem 
                                                                                                             
Global Marketplace: Need for Reform, 35 Wm Mitchell L Rev 38, 65 (2008); Seth R. Leech 
and Emma Greenwood, Keeping America Competitive: A Proposal to Eliminate the Em-
ployment-Based Immigrant Visa Quota, 3 Albany Gov L Rev 322, 334 (2010) (claiming 
that skilled immigrants are deterred from coming to the United States by the visa cap 
and instead choose to go to other countries, which then benefit from their work); Jung S. 
Hahm, Note, American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act of 1998: Balanc-
ing Economic and Labor Interests under the New H-1B Visa Program, 85 Cornell L Rev 
1673, 1692 (2000). 
 62 See Trebilcock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 281–82 (cited in note 6). 
 63 See Arnold De Silva, Earnings of Immigrant Classes in the Early 1980s in Cana-
da: A Reexamination, 23 Canadian Pub Pol 179, 197 (1997) (arguing that skills-based 
screening is largely ineffective and that age is the most relevant predictor of the mi-
grant’s success in the labor market). 
 64 See Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law at 179 (cited in note 1) 
(noting that, in the United States, the courts have not been receptive to extensive resi-
dency requirements as a condition for participating in entitlements), citing Laurence H. 
Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 1380–84 (West 2d ed 1988).  
 65 See Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law at 187 (cited in note 1). 
 66 See Trebilcock and Sudak, 81 NYU L Rev at 291 (cited in note 6). 
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defensible. Still, these policies alone have not led source coun-
tries to let go of their perception that they are losing from the 
outward migration. The idea of a persisting welfare loss associ-
ated with the exit of their valuable citizens continues to limit 
their willingness to support a liberal migration regime. 
III.  MIGRATION FUND: SHARING THE RISKS AND REWARDS OF 
ECONOMIC MIGRATION 
Many scholars have acknowledged the inefficiencies that 
characterize the existing migration policies. They have also sug-
gested reforms that would replace the current policies with vari-
ous alternatives that respond to the legitimate concerns of unde-
sirable migration while preserving the gains from desirable 
migration. This Part builds on these proposals. It develops an 
idea of a Migration Fund that seeks to share the risks and the 
rewards of migration between the migrant, the source country, 
and the destination country. The Migration Fund differs from 
other existing proposals in its focus on aligning the divergent in-
terests of the source and destination countries as opposed to 
solving only the concerns of one or the other the way the existing 
proposals do. 
A. Existing Reform Proposals 
To alleviate the destination countries’ concerns over fiscal 
migration, Professor Michael Trebilcock has advocated for a pri-
vate insurance scheme that would reimburse the destination 
country for any drawings that a migrant makes against noncon-
tributory social programs.67 This insurance would cover the wel-
fare payments, public (noncontributory) pensions, and other ex-
penses that the migrant may become entitled to once residing in 
the destination country. The mandatory social program insur-
ance scheme would mitigate the destination country’s fears of 
fiscally induced migration by making the migrant or his sponsor 
internalize the social costs of migration.68 Professor Eleanor 
Brown has advanced an idea that the migrant would be required 
to post a bond upon entry.69 The migrant would forfeit the bond 
if he violated the conditions of entry, including overstaying his 
 
 67 Michael J. Trebilcock, The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5 Am L & 
Econ Rev 271, 298–313 (2003).  
 68 Id at 298–300, 311–12. 
 69 Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Visa as Property, Visa as Collateral, 64 Vand L 
Rev 1047, 1060–71 (2011). 
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visa.70 A variation of this idea, which Professor Brown discusses 
in connection with temporary guest workers,71 could apply to 
permanent migration as well. The bond could be forfeited in sit-
uations where the migrant needs to rely on social programs, 
thereby insuring the destination country against the risks of so-
cially costly migration. 
Economists such as Gary Becker and Julian Simon have ad-
vocated the removal of immigration quotas and have proposed 
setting a price for entry or, alternatively, making greater use of 
auctions to allocate entry permits. Becker has proposed that any-
one willing to pay a set price, such as $50,000, would be entitled 
to enter the United States immediately.72 Simon calls for periodic 
auctions that would allocate entry permits to those willing to pay 
the most.73 Their proposals rest on the idea that markets would 
allocate entry permits to those who derive the greatest utility 
from migrating and who are therefore willing to pay the highest 
price for the right to migrate.74 These proposals would also likely 
insure the destination countries against fiscally induced migra-
tion, as the high price of entry would deter migrants who would 
likely burden the welfare state.75 
Similarly focusing on the adverse fiscal consequences of mi-
gration to the destination country, Professor Howard Chang has 
argued for the use of immigration tariffs.76 A tariff would take 
the form of a differential income tax on migrants, shifting some 
of the migrants’ income to the public treasury.77 Further, the tax 
would be positive for immigrants with low incomes while nega-
tive for immigrants with high incomes, incentivizing skilled im-
migration while deterring unskilled immigration.78 This way, the 
quotas would be replaced by less generous fiscal policies applied 
 
 70 Id at 1050–52. This proposal is inspired by the Kuwaiti system. Kuwait often re-
quires the migrants to post a bond as a condition of entry for guest workers. The bond 
will be forfeited if the guest worker violates the terms of the visa, including overstaying 
his visa or imposing welfare costs on the Kuwaiti government. See id at 1060. 
 71 Id at 1051–52. 
 72 Gary Becker and Guity Nashat Becker, The Economics of Life: From Baseball to 
Affirmative Action to Immigration, How Real-World Issues Affect Our Everyday Life 58 
(McGraw-Hill 1997). 
 73 Simon, 39 Pol Rev at 71–72 (cited in note 34) (discussing the advantages of an 
auction scheme both for Americans and immigrants); Julian L. Simon, The Economic 
Consequences of Immigration 357–63 (Michigan 2d ed 1999). 
 74 See Becker and Becker, The Economics of Life at 58–69 (cited in note 72); Simon, 
39 Pol Rev at 72 (cited in note 34). 
 75 See Becker and Becker, The Economics of Life at 59 (cited in note 72). 
 76 Chang, 3 UCLA J Intl L & Foreign Aff at 378 (cited in note 5). 
 77 Id at 381–82. 
 78 Id at 378, 384–87. 
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to emigrants—not by reducing their right to entitlements but by 
applying a differential income regime to them.79 
These types of proposals have the potential to improve the 
status quo by removing the inefficiencies associated with the use 
of quotas. They would increase the number of migrants while 
mitigating the concerns for admitting migrants that impose a 
net fiscal cost on the destination country. At the same time, they 
would do little to alleviate the fears of source countries. To re-
spond to the concerns of source countries, these proposals would 
therefore need to be complemented with schemes to compensate 
the source country for the loss of valuable human capital. 
Other scholars have focused on the concerns of source coun-
tries. Some economists, including Jagdish Bhagwati, have pro-
posed taxing the brain drain and thereby compensating the de-
veloping countries for “the loss of the human capital to wealthier 
countries.80 This would entail imposing a supplementary income 
tax on high-skilled emigrants and transferring that tax to the 
source countries. Professors Mihir A. Desai, Devesh Kapur, and 
John McHale have built on the proposal, exploring the use of 
various tax instruments as a way to mitigate the costs of migra-
tion outflows from developing countries.81 For instance, source 
countries could seek to tax their citizens for their global in-
comes. Alternatively, destination countries could collect the mi-
grant’s taxes but afterward remit a proportion of those taxes to 
the source country governments. Yet another option would en-
tail charging the migrant an exit tax at the point of emigration. 
The idea behind any such taxation would be to compensate the 
source country for the costs involved in educating and training a 
migrant who subsequently goes on to benefit the tax base of the 
destination country. 
The problem of complementing the various entry prices (as 
proposed by Trebilcock, Becker, Brown, and Simon) with exit 
prices (as proposed by Bhagwati, Desai, Kapur, and McHale) is 
that implementing both would lead to a version of “double taxa-
tion”—fees imposed simultaneously by the source and the desti-
 
 79 The familiar economic arguments that support tariffs over quotas in restricting 
trade in goods support the use of immigration tariffs over immigration quotas. See id at 380. 
 80 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, The Brain Drain Tax Proposal and the Issues, in Jagdish 
N. Bhagwati and Martin Partington, eds, Taxing the Brain Drain I: A Proposal 3, 20 
(North-Holland 1976). See also Deepaak Nayyar, Migration, Remittances and Capital 
Flows: The Indian Experience 121 (Oxford 1994). 
 81 See Desai, Kapur, and McHale, 11 Intl Tax & Pub Fin at 682–85 (cited in note 51). 
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nation countries.82 These fees would further be levied irrespec-
tive of whether any concerns by either the source country or the 
destination country would be realized. High fees associated with 
both exit and entry would make migration unreasonably costly, 
reducing the welfare of the migrant and limiting the number of 
migrants that ultimately leave as a result. This would likely 
lead to suboptimally low levels of migration, reducing global wel-
fare and thus minimizing the gains that could be divided among 
the parties concerned. 
B. The Creation and Operation of the Migration Fund 
An alternative way to respond to the legitimate concerns of 
source countries and destination countries would be to pool the 
funds that are used to insure the destination countries against 
fiscally induced migration and the source countries against the 
costly brain drain. Ultimately, the funds would be disbursed to 
the party whose concerns will have materialized after infor-
mation about the migrant’s “success,” and the ultimate decision 
to stay or to return, has been gained. 
The Migration Fund would operate in the following way. 
The immigrant or his sponsor would deposit a predetermined 
sum—say $50,000 for the purpose of this discussion—into a Mi-
gration Fund. This Fund could be managed by a private compa-
ny, which would have a contract with the destination country 
government, the source country government, and the migrant 
and/or the migrant’s sponsor. After a certain predetermined pe-
riod—for instance, at the time the migrant becomes eligible for 
naturalization—a determination would be made about the dis-
bursement of the deposited funds.83 The $50,000 would be dis-
bursed differently depending on the outcome with respect to two 
variables: first, whether the migrant has been successful or un-
successful in the destination country and, second, whether the 
migrant remains in the destination country or returns to the 
source country. A migrant is considered “successful” if he re-
mains employed or otherwise capable of supporting himself in 
 
 82 See Michael A. Clemens, Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the 
Sidewalk?, 25 J Econ Persp 83, 92 (Summer 2011) (criticizing Bhagwati’s exit tax pro-
posal on the ground that “the economic equivalent of a large emigration tax is already 
broadly applied” though restrictive measures taken by destination countries). 
 83 The moment at which the migrant is eligible for citizenship would be a natural 
time to make a determination about the disbursement of the funds. It is difficult to justi-
fy the differential treatment with respect to entitlements or any other rights that citi-
zens are eligible for after the migrant becomes a citizen.  
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the destination country. A migrant is considered “unsuccessful” 
if he becomes unemployed and needs to rely on welfare benefits 
to stay in the destination country. Naturally, a migrant that en-
gages in criminal activity or otherwise meets conditions for de-
portation would be considered “unsuccessful.” 
In the case of unsuccessful migrants, the funds from the Mi-
gration Fund would be disbursed to the destination country. If 
the migrant became a fiscal burden, yet still wanted to stay in 
the destination country, the funds would be used to compensate 
the destination country for the costs of the welfare benefits that 
the immigrant claims. Alternatively, the funds could be used to 
cover the costs of repatriating the voluntarily returning migrant 
to the source country. Finally, if the conditions for deporting the 
migrant were met, the costs associated with deportation could be 
recovered from the fund. This way, the destination country 
would assume no risks nor bear any costs in having to support 
an unproductive migrant. The destination country would also 
not have to pay the costs of voluntary repatriation or involun-
tary deportation. Admitting the migrant would therefore be 
“risk free” as the destination country would be insured against 
the negative scenarios of migration. 
In contrast, if the migrant were successful and remained in 
the destination country, the destination country would need no 
compensation from the Migration Fund. The destination country 
would enjoy the positive contribution the migrant makes to the 
welfare of the country through his human capital and tax pay-
ments. Under this scenario, the deposit placed in the fund would 
be divided between two sets of recipients: half the funds would 
be released to the migrant or the migrant’s sponsor, while the 
other half would be remitted to the source country. This way, 
the migrant’s (or his sponsor’s) contribution to the Migration 
Fund would be treated like a bond that is released when the 
conditions motivating the bond (that is, unsuccessful migration) 
failed to materialize. This would further incentivize the migrant 
to remain productive and the sponsor to screen successful mi-
grants. At the same time, the source country would be compen-
sated for the loss of its productive work force and tax reve-
nues—whether based on the high-skilled or low-skilled labor of 
the migrant.84 
 
 84 The willing migrant could, of course, voluntarily send his share of the funds back 
to the source country in the form of remittances. The source country may even employ 
various incentives to induce the migrant to do so (including matching the contributions). 
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Finally, if the successful migrant voluntarily returned to the 
source country, the funds would be released to the migrant.85 
Under this last scenario, the destination country needs no com-
pensation beyond the human capital and taxes it has enjoyed 
during the migrant’s productive time in the destination country. 
The source country similarly needs no compensation as the mi-
grant returns—most likely with an enhanced skill set and accu-
mulated funds that are repatriated back to the source country.86 
While the primary focus of this Article is the movement of 
independent migrants for an economic purpose, a question of 
family migration is often directly related to a migrant’s welfare 
and initial decision to move. In principle, the Migration Fund 
could apply to family-sponsored migrants in the same way. 
Family members could follow the migrant as long as they have a 
sponsor that is willing to deposit the necessary funds or invest 
in a larger “Family Migration Fund.” Most likely, the employer 
sponsor or the migrant himself would sponsor the migrant’s im-
mediate family who are thought to contribute most to the wel-
fare of the primary migrant. It is possible that the idea of a Mi-
gration Fund would, however, deter the more distant relatives 
from migrating in the absence of an independent economic basis 
to migrate (such as an independent economic opportunity that 
entails a sponsoring employer). Again, this may not be a nega-
tive outcome as long as the immediate family of the migrant is 
able to follow the migrant. If we seek to preserve gains to both 
destination and source countries, we may even want to restrict 
the migration of more distant family. If some relatives stay be-
hind in the source country, the migrant is likely to feel more 
connected to the source country. This way, the migrant is also 
more likely to send remittances home or even consider return 
migration. This feature of the Migration Fund would likely fur-
ther enhance the source countries’ support for a liberal interna-
tional migration regime. The restrictive elements of the Family 
Migration Fund would also appeal to commentators who advo-
cate decreasing family migration and increasing employment-
based migration as a way to maximize the destination country 
benefits of migration. 
 
 85 There could be a minimum time limit after which the migrant is eligible for the 
funds as opposed to the sponsor who might have initially paid the bond. This arrange-
ment would reflect an assumption that after a certain number of years, the employer has 
recouped his investment through the labor contribution of the migrant.  
 86 See Drain or Gain?, Economist at 80 (cited in note 20). 
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The idea of the Migration Fund is premised on an idea that 
both destination countries and source countries gain from mi-
gration, yet they both face risks that militate against allowing 
for unrestricted migration. Another assumption motivating the 
proposal is that both sets of countries have some bargaining 
power that enables them to demand their share of the gains. 
Critics may challenge the latter assumption. Some commenta-
tors have argued that destination countries can set their desired 
migration policies unilaterally and are therefore in a position to 
forgo negotiating with source countries.87 If this were correct, 
destination countries would indeed have no incentive to share 
the gains from migration with the source countries. 
It may be true that destination countries have at times the 
leverage to set their migration policies unilaterally. However, at 
other times the source country’s cooperation is desirable. Many 
destination countries have entered into bilateral agreements 
with certain source countries,88 suggesting that both parties can 
gain from a cooperative migration policy. These bilateral agree-
ments are often motivated by destination countries’ need to seek 
source countries’ cooperation in their efforts to deter illegal im-
migration.89 Source countries can gain leverage by withholding 
such cooperation, or by refusing to admit criminal deportees or 
other return migrants that destination countries seek to repa-
triate. The migration issue could also be linked to many other 
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 88 See Rahel Kunz, Depoliticization through Partnership in the Field of Migration: 
The Mexico–US Case, in Kunz, Lavenex, and Panizzon, eds, Multilayered Migration Gov-
ernance 283, 29296 (cited in note 87). 
 89 See, for example, Gordon, 104 Nw U L Rev at 1140–41 (cited in note 87); Kunz, 
Depoliticization through Partnership at 292–96 (cited in note 88); Sergio Carrera and 
Raül Hernández i Sagrera, Mobility Partnerships: ‘Insecurity Partnerships’ for Policy Co-
herence and Migrant Workers’ Human Rights in the EU, in Kunz, Lavenex, and Paniz-
zon, eds, Multilayered Migration Governance 97, 105 (cited in note 87); Natasha Ward, 
Facilitating the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons: Economic Partnership Agree-
ments versus Bilateral Migration Agreements and Mobility Partnerships, in Kunz, Lav-
enex, and Panizzon, eds, Multilayered Migration Governance 143, 146–48 (cited in note 
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policy issues in international negotiations—be it opening mar-
kets for foreign direct investment, securing intellectual property 
rights, fighting terrorism, or undertaking commitments to miti-
gate climate change—where destination countries are dependent 
on source country cooperation and therefore willing to offer 
transfer payments to source countries. These transfer payments 
could include destination countries’ offer to share the gains from 
migration with source countries. 
Finally, source countries’ decisions to restrict outmigration 
would offer an ultimate way for source countries to force desti-
nation countries to share the gains from migration with them. 
These restrictions could consist of prohibitively high exit taxes 
or the requirement (and possible denial) of exit visas. Source 
countries could also threaten to remove emigrants’ citizenship or 
prevent their reentry upon emigration. These types of policies, 
designed to permanently sever migrants’ ties to source coun-
tries, would discourage many migrants from leaving. This would 
be particularly true for destination countries that limit family 
migration, as the decision to emigrate would, in such instances, 
permanently separate families. Any of these policies would deter 
many desirable migrants and therefore harm destination coun-
tries as well. While the benefits of these policies to source coun-
tries would be highly questionable, they would allow the source 
countries to gain leverage against destination countries and 
thereby claim a larger share of the gains generated by migration 
in return for undertaking to ease their restrictions on emigration.  
C. The Benefits of the Migration Fund 
The primary advantage of the Migration Fund is that it al-
lows the relevant parties to allocate the gains from migration 
while simultaneously securing them against the risks of unde-
sirable migration. In other words, the Migration Fund pools the 
risks and rewards associated with migration, paving the way for 
countries to adopt more liberal migration policies. It does this by 
mitigating the prevalent fears and aligning the interests of all 
key stakeholders: migrants, destination countries, and source 
countries. 
The Migration Fund is motivated by the same concerns that 
inspire many other proposals that seek to liberalize migration 
flows. The Migration Fund would allow countries to remove inef-
ficient quotas and abolish the discretionary point systems or 
cumbersome labor certification requirements. The ability to se-
cure the funds needed to insure the migrant against unsuccess-
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ful migration would serve as the sole screen (in addition to man-
datory national security, criminal, and health checks) for wheth-
er the migrant is eligible to enter the destination country. This 
would lead to a greater movement of economic migrants without 
augmenting fears associated with undesirable migration. 
At the same time, the key difference of the proposed Migra-
tion Fund compared to other, existing proposals is twofold. First, 
the expenses paid to the Migration Fund are conditional on an 
outcome; there is no automatic disbursement of funds to a party 
that may not need compensation. Second, the proposal avoids 
imposing a “double burden” on migrants by using the same pool 
of funds to insure both the destination country and the source 
country against outcomes they consider undesirable from their 
perspective. 
The conditionality aspect of the Migration Fund manifests 
itself in the following way. The migrant does not need to pay an 
exit tax (or other compensation to the source country) in all cir-
cumstances. The source country is entitled to compensation only 
in case of a productive migrant who decides not to return. If the 
migrant becomes a burden to the destination country, a reason-
able assumption is that the individual does not represent a sig-
nificant loss of human potential to the source country. In fact, 
the source country may experience a welfare gain when it does 
not need to provide welfare benefits to this individual, assuming 
the individual would have also remained unproductive in the 
source country. Similarly, the source country’s compensation is 
conditional on the migrant not returning: a returning migrant 
can keep the funds, incentivizing a return migration, which in 
itself offers a gain to the source country. Here, no additional 
compensation is paid to the source country. 
Also the compensation to the destination country is condi-
tional: the destination country is not entitled to an automatic 
entry fee, either from a sale or an auction of entry permits. No 
private insurer in the destination country is further entitled to 
an insurance payment. An obligation to compensate the destina-
tion country only materializes when the migrant proves to be 
unproductive yet wants to stay in the destination country or 
when the destination country incurs expenses in repatriating or 
deporting an unsuccessful migrant. Similarly, the migrant (or 
the sponsor) loses the entire entry fee only if the decision to en-
ter was an erroneous one in hindsight, such as when the mi-
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grant becomes unemployed or engages in reprehensible behavior 
that triggers the right to deport the migrant.90 
The Migration Fund also removes the double burden that 
would otherwise be imposed on the migrant: the same pool of 
funds is used to insure the destination and the source countries 
against a possible adverse outcome. This dual use of the same 
funds is premised on the idea that the destination country and 
the source country cannot both lose at the same time. If the mi-
grant is successful in the destination country, only the source 
country can lose. In contrast, if the migrant is unsuccessful, only 
the destination country can lose. There is thus no need for an 
individual migrant to ever compensate both countries. The di-
rect beneficiary of the removal of this double burden is the mi-
grant himself (or his sponsor) who does not need to accumulate 
funds necessary to compensate both the source and the destina-
tion country as a condition for migrating. 
Of course, a counterargument may suggest that double tax-
ation would be avoided if the governments of destination coun-
tries and source countries priced their entry and exit taxes op-
timally based on a correct assessment of the probability that the 
migration may lead to a costly outcome. For instance, if the des-
tination country considered there to be a 50 percent chance of 
the migrant becoming a fiscal burden, it should charge an entry 
fee that reflects only 50 percent of its expected costs of accepting 
an undesirable migrant. Similarly, the source country may agree 
to lower its exit tax by 50 percent under the presumption that 
only half its emigrants will eventually impose a cost by leaving. 
However, the Migration Fund regime would have the advantage 
of compensating both the destination country and the source 
country at the full 100 percent (as opposed to the probability-
based 50 percent) level each time their fears of costly migration 
materialized. Because of the dual use of the same funds and the 
principle that only the deserving party is entitled to claim the 
deposited funds, both the destination country and the source 
country would be fully insured—without increasing the cost on 
the migrant. 
 
 90 If the migrant, however, remains employed, half of the deposited funds would be 
returned to the sponsor or the migrant. Under this scenario, the migrant (or the sponsor) 
would be unlikely to suffer costs by the decision to transfer the other half to the source 
country. This share of the Fund would presumably be more than offset by the income the 
migrant earns and the productive labor that the sponsoring employer enjoys when the 
migrant is successful. 
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The Migration Fund would create incentives for desirable 
behavior, simultaneously accomplishing multiple preferred out-
comes. It would deter migrants that are motivated by access to 
generous welfare benefits, as the migrants would need to use 
their own funds, or the funds of their sponsor, to pay for enti-
tlements. By becoming unproductive, these migrants would for-
go a salary as well as lose the funds paid as a condition for en-
try. The sponsors would also have an incentive to exercise care 
in screening foreign labor given the need to deposit the funds 
under the knowledge that the funds will only be returned if the 
migrant is successful. Destination countries would face few risks 
as they would be compensated if the screening by employers 
fails or if the migrant makes an investment in the Migration 
Fund under overly optimistic assumptions about his employ-
ment potential. Thus, the destination countries would be able to 
enjoy the upside of migration while being insured against the 
downside of migration. Source countries would also be better off: 
they would enjoy compensation for the loss of their productive 
citizens without the risks of alienating them (and their remit-
tances) with coercive tactics such as exit taxes. They could also 
experience higher levels of return migration, as the migrant 
would be lured to return by allowing them to reclaim the entire 
funds that were placed in the Migration Fund. 
The Migration Fund employs some elements of so-called 
“reversible rewards”—an idea that Professor Omri Ben-Shahar 
and I have developed as a way to bolster incentives for desirable 
behavior by combining rewards and sanctions, and linking the 
funding of the two.91 To the extent that the Migration Fund 
would be used to finance the costs of penalties such as deporta-
tion, the Fund would “double” the migrant’s incentives for good 
behavior. Failing to remain in the labor force and engaging in 
criminal activity would entail a dual cost on the migrant: First, 
the migrant would forgo the income associated with productive 
labor as well as the funds deposited in the Migration Fund. Sec-
ond, the migrant would be even likelier to be deported when the 
same funds would be used against the migrant to facilitate the 
deportation. The destination country would face zero costs in 
deporting the individual, as the expenditures would be directly 
reimbursed from the Fund, making the decision to seek deporta-
tion more likely. This way, the prospect of losing twice should 
 
 91 Omri Ben-Shahar and Anu Bradford, Reversible Rewards, 15 Am L & Econ Rev 
*6–12 (forthcoming 2013), online at http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/12/ 
18/aler.ahs018.full.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013). 
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give the migrant an additional incentive to be a productive 
member of the destination country’s economic life and society. 
D. The Downsides of the Migration Fund 
Notwithstanding the many benefits of the Migration Fund, 
the proposal is likely to invite criticism as well. One objection 
might be that unskilled workers in particular are unlikely to be 
able to obtain the requisite funds to migrate. This could lead to 
suboptimally low levels of unskilled migration. Of course, some 
migrants could borrow the funds to enter the destination coun-
try. But if the migrant is unable to supply the requisite collat-
eral to secure the debt, or if the banks in the source countries 
have limited means to enforce debts, functioning lending markets 
will not likely develop.92 This concern would suggest that the 
practical application of the Migration Fund is limited to high-
skilled migration where employers are more likely to pay the 
costs of the migrant’s entry. 
This concern, which applies similarly to all proposals involv-
ing entry fees, seems valid. In response, supporters of entry fees 
may point out that several existing policy tools are designed spe-
cifically to encourage high-skilled migration and discourage low-
skilled migration, justifying this outcome.93 Further, unlike en-
try fees proposed by Becker and others, the Migration Fund in-
volves a conditional payment, which is partially returned in the 
case of successful migration. This should increase the migrant’s 
chances of securing the loan in the first place. In some instances, 
source country governments may even be inclined to guarantee 
such loans, assuming they are entitled to a greater share of the 
gains that the migrant’s decision to emigrate offers. 
A similar concern relates to the impact that the Migration 
Fund would have on illegal immigration. Critics may assert that 
higher barriers to enter the destination country would only in-
centivize the migrants to enter illegally. However, all immigra-
tion restrictions likely have a similar effect. It is not obvious 
why conditional entry fees would encourage illegal migration 
more than existing quotas, point systems, and labor certification 
requirements do. One should also consider that many illegal mi-
 
 92 See Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, 80 U Chi L 
Rev 291, 314–15 (2013) (criticizing the bond proposal advanced by Eleanor Brown on 
similar grounds). 
 93 See, for example, Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann, High-Skilled Immi-
gration Policy in Europe 21 (Institute for the Study of Labor Dec 2010), online at http://ftp 
.iza.org/dp5399.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013). 
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grants currently bear substantial costs related to various smug-
gling services that they use in an effort gain an illegal entry into 
the desired destination. According to the International Organi-
zation for Migration, these fees—facilitating illegal entry—vary 
significantly but can amount to as high as $35,000 for an indi-
vidual migrant.94 The Migration Fund would allow the prospec-
tive migrant to forgo these expenses, lowering the migrant’s per-
ception of the net cost of entering legally. 
The Migration Fund may also be criticized in that it does not 
remove all concerns harbored by destination countries. It directly 
responds to the destination country concern of fiscally induced 
migration and the source country concern of brain drain. How-
ever, the Migration Fund does not directly address the destina-
tion country concern of labor displacement. In fact, if the labor 
market certification requirement is removed by making the 
availability of funds the sole criteria for admission, one could 
expect the labor displacement concerns to become even more 
prevalent. 
Nonetheless, this should not be a significant concern. First, 
the Migration Fund requires a considerable investment from the 
employer sponsoring the entry of a foreign worker. It is reason-
able to assume that the employer is prepared to incur this ex-
pense only if the domestic workforce cannot satisfy the demand. 
This would be the case when there is a domestic labor shortage 
or when foreign labor and domestic labor are not substitutes. If 
domestic labor were available, the employers would likely not 
agree to pay the premium in the Migration Fund, given that 
even under the best scenario—that of a successful migrant—half 
the funds need to be returned to the source country at no direct 
benefit to the employer. Second, if the working migrant were to 
displace domestic workers, the additional tax revenues paid by 
the migrant could be directed to these displaced workers as 
compensation.95 These two factors, together with the recognition 
that migrants do not only supply labor but also create jobs by 
demanding goods and services,96 should alleviate the concerns 
relating to labor displacement in the destination country. 
 
 94 World Migration Report 2003: Managing Migration; Challenges and Responses for 
People on the Move 303–15 & table 17.21 (International Organization of Migration 2003), 
online at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/WMR_2003.pdf (visited Mar 3, 2013). 
 95 See Howard F. Chang, The Economic Impact of International Labor Migration: 
Recent Estimates and Policy Implications, 16 Temple Polit & CR L Rev 321, 330 (2007). 
 96 See id at 328. 
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Alternatively, should the concern of labor displacement 
nonetheless persist, the destination country could consider dis-
bursing the sponsoring employer’s or migrant’s portion of the 
Migration Fund to itself instead. The destination country would 
then redistribute the funds as additional welfare benefits to dis-
placed domestic workers. This way, the employer would no long-
er be required to certify ex ante that no labor displacement 
would take place and could instead be required to partake in the 
compensation of displaced domestic workers ex post, particularly 
if concrete effects of labor displacement were shown. 
CONCLUSION 
Economic theories and empirical studies on economic migra-
tion have for a long time supported greater liberalization of in-
ternational economic migration. Contrary to this evidence, fears 
of negative distributional consequences associated with migra-
tion have kept borders tightly regulated. This Article has sought 
to respond to the source and destination countries’ key concerns 
without taking a position on whether those concerns are well-
founded. Instead, the above discussion is built on a premise that 
these concerns constrain countries’ ability to free migration. 
This calls for policies that reframe the migration debate from a 
zero-sum game to a positive-sum game. Countries will only 
agree to liberalize migration flows if both destination and source 
countries are insured against the downsides of migration while 
guaranteed a share of the gains that beneficial migration cre-
ates. The multiuse and conditional nature of the Migration Fund 
would have the advantage of simultaneously addressing the con-
cerns of source countries and destination countries without im-
posing a dual burden on the migrant. As a result, we should see 
greater acceptance of international economic migration, result-
ing in greater global welfare, as well as a more equal distribu-
tion of that welfare. 
